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II.-73 
LOST OPPORTUNITY: SUPREME COURT 
DECLINES TO RESOLVE CIRCUIT  
SPLIT ON BRADY OBLIGATIONS  
DURING PLEA-BARGAINING 
Abstract: On September 18, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville held that prosecutors are not consti-
tutionally required to disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants dur-
ing the plea-bargaining process. With its decision, the Fifth Circuit entered the 
circuit split over the meaning of impeachment evidence in the context of the 
United States Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in United States v. Ruiz, where the 
Court held that the prosecution need not turn over impeachment evidence during 
the plea-bargaining process. Some circuits interpret impeachment evidence to in-
clude exculpatory evidence, whereas others had not. This Comment argues that 
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in the next circuit case to clarify the 
definition of impeachment evidence in Ruiz. Further, this Comment argues that as 
things stand, Supreme Court precedent requires the disclosure of exculpatory ev-
idence during the plea-bargaining process. 
INTRODUCTION 
George Alvarez spent four years in prison before finding out that the gov-
ernment had evidence demonstrating that he was innocent of the crime for 
which he had been convicted.1 In 2005, Alvarez was arrested for public intoxi-
cation and burglary of a motor vehicle.2 At the time, Alvarez was seventeen 
years old and a ninth-grade special education student.3 Shortly after his arrest 
and subsequent arrival at a detention center in Brownsville, Texas, an alterca-
tion occurred between Alvarez and Officer Jesus Arias.4 Alvarez was charged 
with, and pled guilty to, assault on a public servant in March 2006.5 Four years 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
2690 (2019). 
 2 Id. at 386. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 387–88. The scuffle started when Alvarez was placing a phone call in the holding area of 
the jail and the phone stopped working, causing Alvarez to become disruptive. Maurice Possley, 
George Alvarez, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (July 6, 2017) https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5166 [https://perma.cc/8826-8YAN]. According to Officer 
Arias, he attempted to move Alvarez to a cell and Alvarez assaulted him. Id. Other officers rushed to 
help Arias restrain Alvarez. Id. 
 5 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388. Assault on a public servant is a felony in Texas. TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 22.01(b)(1) (West 2019). The judge did not sentence Alvarez to jail time and instead sen-
tenced him to six months of drug treatment and eight years of probation upon completion of the drug 
II.-74 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
later, a previously undisclosed exculpatory video of the incident surfaced, 
which did not show the events described by Officer Arias and instead showed 
Arias as the initial aggressor.6 Because of the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision 
in Brady v. Maryland, prior to trial, prosecutors are constitutionally required to 
turn over any evidence in the government’s possession tending to show a de-
fendant’s innocence.7 Believing that the undisclosed video demonstrated his 
innocence, Alvarez filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of Brady.8 
In 2018, in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that withholding the video did not constitute a violation 
of Brady because Brady’s requirement that the prosecution disclose exculpato-
ry evidence only applies during trial and not during plea-bargaining.9 In decid-
ing Alvarez, the Fifth Circuit joined with similar holdings of the First, Second, 
and Fourth Circuits and split with holdings of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits.10 After the Fifth Circuit decision, Alvarez filed a petition for a writ of 
                                                                                                                           
program. Possley, supra note 4. Alvarez violated the terms of his probation by failing to adhere to the 
drug treatment program specifications. Id. Thus, in November 2006, the state revoked Alvarez’s pro-
bation and sentenced him to eight years in prison. Id. 
 6 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388 (stating that the video surfaced about four years after Alvarez started 
his prison sentence); Possley, supra note 4. Exculpatory evidence is any evidence that tends to show 
that a criminal defendant did not commit the crime alleged. Exculpatory Evidence, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see infra note 23 and accompanying text (defining exculpatory evidence 
as evidence helpful to the accused and material to guilt or punishment). 
 7 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that when the government withholds 
evidence during trial that is beneficial to the defendant, it is a violation of due process if the evidence is 
relevant to guilt or punishment, regardless of the government’s intentions). The Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution prevents the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment puts that same 
responsibility on states. Id. amend. XIV § 1. Because a criminal trial could result in the deprivation of 
a person’s liberty by incarceration, the Constitution demands that the accused receive fair treatment. 
See Michael N. Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady 
Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3603 (2013) (stating that citizens may 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). The Supreme Court previous-
ly held in 1935 in Mooney v. Holohan that the due process requirement is not met when a conviction 
is obtained through the intentional deception of the jury and judge. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). The 
holding in Brady extended the holding of Mooney to situations where the jury and judge are deceived 
because of the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 8 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388; see Matt Ford, The Senseless Legal Precedent That Enables Wrongful 
Convictions, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151331/brady-rule-
plea-bargaining-wrongful-convictions [https://perma.cc/8EEF-TJM4] (noting that the video showed 
Officer Arias putting Alvarez in a choke hold and then a head lock, while Alvarez struggled in his 
grip). Habeas corpus is Latin for “that you have the body.” Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 6. A writ of habeas corpus provides a means for a person who is being detained to 
come before a court to challenge the legality of the detention. Id. 
 9 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 394. Plea-bargaining refers to the negotiating pro-
cess that takes place between defendants and prosecutors prior to trial. Plea Bargain, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 6. Prosecutors may offer the defendant a reduced sentence or dismiss certain 
charges in exchange for the defendant waiving the right to trial and admitting guilt. Id. 
 10 Compare Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (asserting that any evidence 
that would cause a defendant to go to trial rather than take a plea must be turned over at the plea-
2020] Brady Obligations During Plea-Bargaining II.-75 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.11 Despite the disagreement among lower 
courts and the significant impact the review could have had on the fairness of 
plea-bargaining, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.12 The Court’s review of 
Alvarez would have had enormous implications on due process for criminal 
defendants who resolve their cases through guilty pleas.13 
This Comment demonstrates that the prevalence of plea bargains in the 
modern criminal justice system renders necessary an extension of Brady to the 
plea-bargaining phase.14 Part I discusses the history of the constitutional obli-
                                                                                                                           
bargaining stage), United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
exculpatory evidence must be turned over to the defendant prior to entering a guilty plea), and 
McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutors are constitution-
ally required to disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining process), with Alvarez, 904 
F.3d at 392 (holding that United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), applies to exculpatory and im-
peachment evidence), United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that crimi-
nal defendants are not constitutionally entitled to knowledge of all information pertinent to their cases 
before entering a guilty plea), Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (suggesting that 
Ruiz applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence because the Supreme Court has treated 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence the same for Brady claims), and United States v. Moussaoui, 
591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing to its prior interpretation of Ruiz to suggest that prosecutors 
are probably not constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining 
phase). 
 11 Alvarez, 139 S. Ct. at 2690. Certiorari means “to be more fully informed” in Latin. Certiorari, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. A writ of certiorari, which refers to the process of an ap-
pellate court asking a lower court to provide it with the record of a case, is a way for an appellate court 
to conduct discretionary review of cases that come before lower courts. Id. 
 12 Alvarez, 139 S. Ct. at 2690. Prosecutors currently have much more bargaining power than de-
fendants during the plea-bargaining process because of their greater awareness of the evidence against 
the defendant. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ 
[https://perma.cc/EB3Q-SYM4]. By granting certiorari in Alvarez, the Supreme Court could have 
helped level the playing field for criminal defendants. See id. (discussing how prosecutors, who have 
access to police reports, witness interviews, and other evidence, enter plea bargain negotiations with a 
significant advantage over defense attorneys because prosecutors can leverage the information imbal-
ance to secure guilty pleas). 
 13 Rakoff, supra note 12. Access to exculpatory information is especially important to ensure the 
fairness of criminal proceedings for indigent and minority defendants, who are more likely to suffer 
the negative consequences of hurried and haphazard plea bargains. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON 
LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16 (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.auth
checkdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC3F-BL37] (discussing how indigent defendants are impacted by 
“meet 'em and plead 'em” attorneys, who are public defenders that meet their clients for the first time 
on the day of trial with a plea deal prepared for them to sign); Carlos Berdejo, Criminalizing Race: 
Racial Disparities in Plea Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2018) (arguing that data on plea 
bargains shows that prosecutors unintentionally consider race to assess a defendant’s likelihood of 
reoffending and a defendant’s criminal nature). 
 14 See Rakoff, supra note 12 (stating that of the 2.2 million people currently incarcerated in the 
United States, over ninety percent ended up there because of a plea bargain and sentence decided by a 
prosecutor, instead of a guilty finding by a jury and a sentence determined by a judge). Plea-
bargaining has replaced trial by jury as the primary method for resolving criminal cases. See id. (stat-
ing that in 2013, over ninety-five percent of federal criminal charges ended with a plea bargain). Be-
II.-76 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
gations for evidence disclosure and the role of Alvarez in that history.15 Part II 
discusses the positions of the different circuits regarding whether exculpatory 
evidence must be turned over during the plea-bargaining phase.16 Finally, Part 
III argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence requires the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining phase.17 
I. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE: ALVAREZ’S 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Alvarez v. City of Brownsville is the latest circuit court decision address-
ing whether prosecutors are constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory 
evidence during the plea-bargaining process.18 Part I of this Comment discuss-
es the legal landscape and factual background of Alvarez, as well as the case’s 
procedural history.19 Section A of this Part discusses the holdings of two semi-
nal Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, decided in 1963, and United 
States v. Ruiz, decided in 2002, and analyzes the Court’s reasoning for its dis-
covery requirements.20 Section B of this Part discusses the factual background 
and procedural history of Alvarez.21 
A. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Required  
Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence 
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence requires the prosecution to disclose 
to the defense any exculpatory evidence it possesses before the defendant’s 
criminal trial.22 Exculpatory evidence is evidence that is helpful to the accused 
                                                                                                                           
cause of the prevalence of plea-bargaining, criminal defendants should receive the same constitutional 
protections they are given at trial, including access to Brady material. See Petegorsky, supra note 7, at 
3612–13 (arguing that the expansion of Brady to plea-bargaining would prevent prosecutors from 
exaggerating the quality of the government’s evidence to secure a conviction). 
 15 See infra notes 18–62 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 63–98 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 99–124 and accompanying text. 
 18 See 904 F.3d at 392–94 (noting that this case is the latest in a long line of circuit court cases 
interpreting Ruiz); infra notes 32–45 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court in Ruiz held 
that impeachment information need not be disclosed prior to a defendant entering a guilty plea). 
 19 See infra notes 18–62 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 22–46 and accompanying text. See generally Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633 (holding that 
Brady requirements do not apply during plea-bargaining); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that when 
the government withholds evidence at trial that is beneficial to the defendant, it is a violation of due pro-
cess if the evidence is relevant to guilt or punishment, regardless of the government’s intentions). 
 21 See infra notes 47–62 and accompanying text. 
 22 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: 
Knowledge, Access, and Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 32–34 (2015) (describing 
how the adversarial system still requires protections for the rights of the accused and how the Brady 
decision ensures that the defense can benefit from the facts and information that the government pos-
sesses). 
2020] Brady Obligations During Plea-Bargaining II.-77 
and material to the accused’s guilt or punishment.23 Exculpatory evidence dif-
fers from impeachment evidence, which tends to be any information that might 
be helpful to the defendant but would not likely change the outcome of a trial.24 
The requirement to disclose such evidence protects defendants’ right to due pro-
cess.25 There are two seminal Supreme Court cases on the topic of required dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence: Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Ruiz.26 
In Brady, decided in 1963, the Supreme Court articulated the pre-trial 
discovery requirements prescribed by the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion.27 There, the trial court convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, and 
the defendant appealed after discovering that the prosecution withheld his 
companion’s confession to carrying out the murder alone.28 During the trial, 
the defendant took the stand and admitted to being involved in the robbery of 
the victim, but maintained that his companion acted alone in killing the vic-
tim.29 The Court held that when the government withholds evidence beneficial 
to the defendant, it is a violation of due process if the evidence is relevant to 
guilt or punishment, regardless of the government’s intentions.30 The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material when it is relevant to the legal questions or facts 
involved in the case. Material Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
 24 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Brady, Trust, and Error, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 447, 459 (2012) 
(explaining that impeachment evidence could include information about why a certain witness might 
be unreliable, which could help a defendant’s case, whereas exculpatory evidence might include in-
formation about an alibi that would decisively establish factual innocence). 
 25 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that the right of a 
defendant to receive exculpatory Brady evidence before trial is rooted in the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution, which prevents the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law). 
 26 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that prior to trial, prosecutors are required to turn over any 
evidence favorable to the defendant that is material to the defendant’s guilt or innocence); Ruiz, 536 
U.S. at 633 (holding that prosecutors are not constitutionally required to turn over impeachment evi-
dence during the plea-bargaining process). 
 27 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements 
the due process clause places on prosecutors). 
 28 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. First-degree murder is often defined as “murder that is willful, deliber-
ate, or premeditated, or committed during the course of a dangerous felony.” First-Degree Murder, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. The defense had asked the prosecution for any out of court 
statements made by Brady’s companion, Boblit. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. The prosecution turned over 
some of Boblit’s statements, but withheld a statement in which Boblit admitted to committing the 
murder. Id. 
 29 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. The statement by Boblit, which the prosecution withheld, did not come 
to light until after the appellate court affirmed Brady’s conviction. Id. The case came before the Su-
preme Court on certiorari to determine whether Maryland’s Court of Appeals violated Brady’s consti-
tutional right to due process when it restricted his new trial to the question of punishment. Id. at 85. 
 30 Id. at 87. The Court determined that Boblit’s statements would not have been allowed into 
evidence under Maryland law, so whether the prosecution was required to disclose Boblit’s statements 
was irrelevant. Id. at 90–91. Interestingly, during their arguments, neither side addressed whether 
criminal defendants are entitled to exculpatory evidence prior to trial, and the outcome of Brady did 
not require the Court to answer this question. Thomas L. Dybdahl, “An Odd, Almost Senseless Series 
of Events,” MARSHALL PROJECT (June 24, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/06/24/an-
II.-78 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
reasoned that withholding material evidence causes unfair trials, and unfair 
trials violate defendants’ rights to due process of law.31 
In Ruiz, decided in 2002, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit 
by holding that defendants are not constitutionally entitled to receive im-
peachment evidence during pre-trial plea bargains.32 There, after law enforce-
ment caught the defendant with thirty kilograms of marijuana, the prosecution 
offered her a “fast track” plea bargain.33 Fast track pleas, which were common 
in the Southern District of California where Ruiz was arrested, require defend-
ants to “waive indictment, trial, and appeal.”34 In exchange for waiving those 
rights, the prosecution suggests a sentence two levels lower than the sentence 
otherwise recommended under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.35 If the de-
fendant in Ruiz had accepted the fast track plea she was offered, she would 
have benefitted from the reduced sentence but waived certain rights, including 
the right to receive impeachment evidence about witnesses or informants and 
the right to evidence that would bolster affirmative defenses.36 The defendant 
                                                                                                                           
odd-almost-senseless-series-of-events [https://perma.cc/8BL4-E5QE]. Yet, in the majority opinion, 
Justice William Douglas used the opportunity presented by Brady to advance his own desire to make 
the criminal justice system a vehicle for discovering the truth, rather than an adversarial system. See 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (expressing in dicta that the goals of the criminal justice system are fairness and 
justice, and the focus should not be on winning or losing at trial). 
 31 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (stating that “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair”). Justice Douglas sought to make justice and facts the focus of the 
criminal justice system, rather than focusing on the adversarial nature of the system that can pit prose-
cutors against defendants at all costs, by ensuring that helpful information cannot be withheld from 
defendants for the sake of securing a conviction. Dybdahl, supra note 30. 
 32 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (holding that the Constitution does not require disclosure of im-
peachment evidence during plea-bargaining). 
 33 Id. at 625. Fast track pleas were created in the 1990s by the Offices of the United States Attor-
neys to manage the enormous number of immigration-related cases. Elizabeth Webster, Fast Sentenc-
ing: A Possible Solution to the Divisive Discretion, 77 MO. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2012). The pleas 
were primarily used in cases where undocumented immigrants attempted to return to the United States 
illegally, and the pleas replaced charges with a maximum sentence of twenty years with charges carry-
ing a maximum sentence of two years. Id. at 1234. In exchange for the reduction, defendants waived a 
variety of rights, like indictment, motions, and appeals, the result of which essentially guaranteed an 
immediate guilty plea, deportation, and no appeal. Id. 
 34 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. 
 35 Id. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines require judges to consider various factors when determin-
ing a sentence, including the defendant’s criminal history and the sentencing range recommended by 
the Guidelines. Sentencing Guidelines, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 721, 722–23 (2012). The 
Guidelines provide a sentencing range through a table that contains six criminal history categories and 
forty-three offense levels. Id. Judges are not required to sentence defendants according to the guide-
lines and may deviate from the guidelines by sentencing the defendant at a higher or lower level when 
there are “aggravating or mitigating” factors involved. Id. at 756. The judge must explicitly state the 
reason for any deviation from the Guidelines. Id. at 757. 
 36 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. In this context, impeachment evidence refers to evidence that casts doubt 
on the credibility of a witness. Impeachment Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
Affirmative defenses are raised not to challenge the facts alleged, but instead to provide a legally 
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rejected the fast track plea because she did not wish to waive those rights, but, 
after her indictment, she decided to enter a standard plea that did not offer the 
reduced sentencing recommendation.37 The defendant appealed on the grounds 
that the fast track plea violated Brady by requiring defendants to waive the 
right to receive impeachment evidence.38 
The Ninth Circuit held that a plea is involuntary if the government with-
holds the same impeachment evidence that it would be required to disclose be-
fore trial.39 In response to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the government peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which it granted.40 The Supreme Court 
explored whether the Constitution’s Fifth and Sixth Amendments required pre-
guilty plea disclosure of impeachment evidence.41 It held that the Constitution 
contains no such requirement.42 The Court reasoned that impeachment infor-
mation is essential to the fairness of a trial, but because defendants waive their 
right to a fair trial by entering pleas, the Constitution does not require disclosure 
of impeachment information during the plea-bargaining process.43 For a plea 
bargain to be constitutional it must be entered voluntarily, and the Court held that 
disclosure of impeachment evidence is not relevant to the voluntariness of a 
plea.44 The Court also reasoned that the balance of due process considerations, 
                                                                                                                           
recognized excuse for the behavior alleged, like self-defense. Affirmative Defense, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
 37 Ruiz, 536 U.S at 625–26. 
 38 Id. at 628–29 (explaining that the defendant appealed her sentence on the grounds that it “was 
imposed in violation of law” because the plea required defendants to waive their right to “exculpatory 
impeachment information” from the government, which violates the Constitution). 
 39 Id. at 629. Supreme Court precedent requires that guilty pleas be entered voluntarily to be valid. 
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must 
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circum-
stances and likely consequences.”). 
 40 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 626. 
 41 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1; see Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969) (“[P]leading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers, and the Sixth Amendment right 
to trial by jury.”)). The language of Ruiz suggests that impeachment evidence is any information rele-
vant to the defense that could help the defense’s case. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632 (stating that, in consider-
ing the requirement to disclose impeachment evidence, the Court held that the government has no 
obligation to disclose all potentially favorable evidence to the defendant).  
 42 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628–29. 
 43 Id. at 628–29; see Friedman, 618 F.3d at 153 (noting that impeachment evidence is often relat-
ed to the reliability of government witnesses and used to expose issues with witness’s credibility). 
 44 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that a plea cannot be voluntary if 
the defendant is not aware of material evidence possessed by the government); United States v. Ruiz, 
241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendants must have knowledge of any material 
information possessed by the government in order for a plea to be voluntary). In 1969, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Boykin that valid plea bargains must be voluntary because entering a plea bargain in-
volves waiving important constitutional rights, including the right against self-incrimination, the right 
to trial by jury, and the right to confront adversarial witnesses. 395 U.S. at 242–43. The Court in Ruiz 
reasoned that access to impeachment evidence was essential to a trial’s fairness, not a plea’s voluntar-
iness. 536 U.S. at 629. The Court classified impeachment evidence at the plea-bargaining phase as 
II.-80 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
which include (1) the type of individual interest involved, (2) the effectiveness of 
the proposed protection, and (3) the burden on the government, establish that 
there is no right to impeachment evidence during the plea-bargaining process.45 
Lower courts disagree as to whether the ruling in Ruiz applies only to impeach-
ment evidence or if it applies to exculpatory evidence as well.46 
B. Alvarez’s Factual Background and Procedural History 
In Alvarez, the Fifth Circuit grappled with whether the holding in Ruiz ap-
plied to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence.47 George Alvarez was on-
ly seventeen years old when the Brownsville Police Department arrested him on 
suspicion of public intoxication and burglary of a motor vehicle in 2005.48 After 
his arrest and shortly after arriving at a detention center in Brownsville, Texas, a 
physical confrontation occurred between Alvarez and Officer Jesus Arias.49 Al-
varez subsequently was charged with and pled guilty to “assault on a public 
servant.”50 A previously undisclosed exculpatory video of the incident surfaced 
about four years later, and Alvarez filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the 
Brownsville Police Department violated Brady when it failed to disclose the vid-
eo.51 After a new trial in October 2010, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
information that would reveal the strength of the prosecution’s case, which the Constitution does not 
require the prosecution to disclose. Id. at 630. 
 45 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. The Court reasoned that there are already sufficient protections to allay 
Brady concerns. Id. The Court pointed out that the fast track plea stipulated that evidence that would 
establish a defendant’s factual innocence would be turned over before the defendant entered a guilty 
plea. Id. Additionally, the Court reasoned that defendants are protected by Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the government present facts supporting the charge 
that are sufficient for a judge to accept a guilty plea. Id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that 
“[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for 
the plea”). On the other hand, requiring the disclosure of impeachment evidence would adversely 
impact the government’s interests by requiring greater pre-plea preparation, interfering with investiga-
tions, and possibly decreasing the government’s reliance on pleas. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32. 
 46 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (detailing the circuit split between the First, Second, 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits and the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). 
 47 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 392 (noting that although the Supreme Court held in Ruiz that defend-
ants are not constitutionally entitled to impeachment evidence during the plea-bargaining process, it 
did not directly decide whether defendants are entitled to exculpatory evidence). 
 48 Id. at 385–86. 
 49 Id. at 386. 
 50 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1); Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388. 
 51 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388. The video of the altercation between Alvarez and Arias surfaced 
during the investigation of another lawsuit involving Officer Arias. Possley, supra note 4. In 2008, 
Jose Lopez sued Officer Arias for use of excessive force after an incident occurred with Officer Arias 
that was similar to the incident involving Alvarez. Id. Like Alvarez, Lopez faced a charge of assault-
ing a public officer after his scuffle with Office Arias, but Lopez refused to plead guilty. Id. At trial, 
Lopez’s defense attorney asked if there were any videos of the incident and only then did the Browns-
ville police turn over a recording that demonstrated Lopez’s innocence and Arias’s misconduct. Id. 
The jury acquitted Lopez and Lopez filed his excessive force civil suit. Id. During the investigation for 
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determined that Alvarez was “actually innocent” of committing the assault.52 
The court annulled his conviction and the prosecution dropped all corresponding 
charges.53 Alvarez filed civil suit against the City of Brownsville in 2011, claim-
ing it had violated Brady through its nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence dur-
ing his criminal trial.54 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment addressing wheth-
er the Brownsville Police Department’s failure to disclose the video constitut-
ed a Brady violation.55 Although the parties disagreed over whether the video 
was exculpatory, the ultimate question for the court involved whether the gov-
ernment had a duty to disclose this potentially exculpatory evidence during the 
plea-bargaining phase.56 The district court agreed with Alvarez’s assertion that 
                                                                                                                           
the civil suit, Lopez’s attorney discovered the video of the scuffle between Alvarez and Officer Arias 
and gave it to Alvarez’s attorney. Id. 
 52 Ex parte Alvarez, No. AP–76,434, 2010 WL 4009076 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2010). The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision that Alvarez was “actually innocent” created controversy, 
which is detailed in the concurrence by Judge Edith Jones. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 394–95 (Jones, J., 
concurring). Justice Jones questioned whether the defense doctored the newly discovered video by 
only showing the part of the video where Officer Arias restrains Alvarez, and not the events leading 
up to that moment. Id. Judge Jones also probed whether the defense colluded with District Attorney 
Armando Villalobos, who never questioned the video and instead agreed to a new trial right away. Id. 
Judge Jones also added that Alvarez’s then-attorney Eduardo Lucio and D.A. Villalobos together 
faced charges in a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and bribery 
case. Id.  
 53 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388. Judge Jones also expressed suspicion about District Attorney Villa-
lobos dismissing the charges against Alvarez when the Court of Appeals remanded the case. See id. at 
394–95 (Jones, J., concurring) (questioning if Alvarez’s release was a managed job). Judge Jones 
pointed out that Alvarez had to be “exonerated” to move forward with a civil suit against the city 
seeking monetary damages. Id. That, combined with the fact that Alvarez’s civil suit occurred in fed-
eral court at the same time as the RICO and bribery trial involving attorneys Villalobos and Lucio, 
should have been enough for the lower court to inquire further into whether Alvarez’s claim of inno-
cence was legitimate. Id. Judge Jones suggested the claim could instead be the result of a scheme 
hatched by the attorneys involved to get a payout from Alvarez’s civil suit. Id. 
 54 Id. at 388. Alvarez also sued Officer Arias and other members of the Brownsville Police De-
partment. Id. The court dismissed some of those charges at summary judgment, and it also dismissed 
the claim against Officer Arias in his individual capacity after both parties filed a voluntary stipulation 
of dismissal. Id. The only matters left for trial related to Alvarez’s claim of a Brady violation against 
the City of Brownsville for nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence. Id. 388–89.  
 55 Id. The parties filed motions for summary judgment concerning the Brownsville Police Depart-
ment’s policy of nondisclosure and the possibility that this policy caused the Brady violation. Id. A party 
requests a motion for summary judgment when there are no facts in dispute and the only issue before the 
court is how the law applies to the undisputed facts. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6.  
 56 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 392 (explaining that prior to reviewing Alvarez’s petition, the Fifth 
Circuit’s precedent held that the Constitution did not require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
during the plea-bargaining phase and that this case provided an opportunity to upset established prec-
edent, which the court declined to take); id. at 394 (Jones, J., concurring) (highlighting the controver-
sy surrounding the video shown during trial, which in her opinion cut out over thirty critical seconds 
of the encounter between Alvarez and Arias and seriously cast doubt upon Alvarez’s claim of inno-
cence); supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that plea-bargaining occurs prior to trial and 
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the City violated Brady when it failed to turn over the exculpatory video and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Alvarez.57 The matter went to a jury to 
determine monetary damages, and the court awarded Alvarez $2,300,000.58 
The City appealed to the Fifth Circuit.59 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the City, holding that the failure to disclose Brady material 
during the plea-bargaining process does not violate the Constitution.60 Alvarez 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied on 
June 13, 2019.61 The denial has left the lower courts in a state of disagreement 
over the Ruiz decision and has also left criminal defendants at risk for unfair 
treatment during the plea-bargaining process.62 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In 2018, in deciding Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, the Fifth Circuit entered 
into the debate over whether criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to 
                                                                                                                           
involves the prosecution negotiating with the defendant to admit guilt in exchange for a reduced sen-
tence). 
 57 See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, No. CV B: 11-78, 2013 WL 12141360, at *12 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 25, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. B-11-078, 2013 WL 12141361 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 19, 2013), rev’d in part, 860 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2017), on reh’g en banc, 904 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 
2018), and rev’d, 904 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that a Brady violation occurred because (1) 
Alvarez admitted that he only pleaded guilty because he thought the government had a strong case 
against him, and therefore, he had a right to see the exculpatory video before entering a guilty plea, 
and (2) the policy goal of finality of convictions did not apply here because the Court of Appeals 
already overturned Alvarez’s conviction). 
 58 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 388–89. The jury determined that Alvarez was entitled to $2,000,000 in 
compensation for his wrongful imprisonment, and the parties agreed that Alvarez was owed $300,000 
in attorney’s fees, leading Alvarez to receive $2,300,000 in damages. Id. 
 59 Id. at 389. 
 60 Id. A panel of the Fifth Circuit court first heard the appeal. Id. It reversed the monetary damag-
es awarded to Alvarez and dismissed his claim against the City. Id. The Fifth Circuit reheard the case 
en banc and reached the same conclusion as the panel. Id. 
 61 Alvarez, 139 S. Ct. 2690 (2019); see supra note 11 and accompanying text (defining writ of 
certiorari). 
 62 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 394. Compare Smith, 510 F.3d at 1148 (suggesting that exculpatory evi-
dence should be disclosed during plea bargains), Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 562 (suggesting that exculpa-
tory evidence must be turned over to the defendant prior to entering a guilty plea), and McCann, 337 
F.3d at 788 (determining that exculpatory evidence should be disclosed during the plea-bargaining 
process), with Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 385–86 (holding that Ruiz applies to exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence), Mathur, 624 F.3d at 507 (holding that exculpatory evidence need not be disclosed during 
the plea-bargaining process), Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154 (suggesting that Ruiz applies to impeachment 
and exculpatory evidence), and Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 286 (suggesting that prosecutors are probably 
not constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining phase). The 
absence of a Brady requirement during the plea-bargaining process enables prosecutors to be vague or 
in some cases misleading about the strength of the government’s case. See Rakoff, supra note 12 
(explaining that prosecutors’ exclusive access to evidence, combined with their discretion in charging 
and sentencing, creates a power imbalance that can pressure defendants into pleading guilty). 
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exculpatory evidence prior to entering a guilty plea.63 The First, Second, and 
Fourth Circuits, like the Fifth Circuit, have suggested that they are not.64 The 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have acknowledged that 
they might be.65 Part A of this section discusses the decision of the Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits to allow defendants to make Brady claims after enter-
ing guilty pleas.66 Part B of this section discusses the decisions of the First, Sec-
ond, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits to reject such claims.67 
A. In Favor of Brady Claims After Guilty Pleas:  
The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have suggested that the govern-
ment is constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory evidence to defend-
ants before defendants plead guilty.68 In 2003, in McCann v. Mangialardi, the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether Brady v. Maryland requires the pre-guilty 
plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence.69 The court identified two aspects of 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See 904 F.3d 382, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2018) (detailing the positions of other circuit courts regard-
ing whether defendants are constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence prior to entering a guilty 
plea). 
 64 See id. at 385–86 (holding that United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), applies to exculpa-
tory and impeachment evidence); United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding 
that criminal defendants are not constitutionally entitled to knowledge of all information pertinent to 
their cases before entering a guilty plea); Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (sug-
gesting that Ruiz applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence because the Supreme Court 
has treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence the same for Brady claims); United States v. 
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing to its prior interpretation of Ruiz to suggest that 
prosecutors are probably not constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory evidence during the 
plea-bargaining phase). 
 65 See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (asserting that any evidence that 
would cause a defendant to go to trial rather than take a plea must be turned over at the plea-
bargaining stage); United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
exculpatory evidence must be turned over to the defendant prior to entering a guilty plea); McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutors are constitutionally required 
to disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining process). 
 66 See infra notes 68–83 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 84–98 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 69–83 and accompanying text. 
 69 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see McCann, 337 F.3d at 787 (exploring the possibil-
ity that, after Ruiz, defendants may claim that their guilty pleas were invalid if they were entered 
without knowledge of undisclosed exculpatory evidence). Demetrius McCann was a top associate of a 
cocaine trafficker in Chicago, Otis Moore. McCann, 337 F.3d at 783. Moore also employed Sam 
Mangialardi, the deputy chief of the Chicago Heights police. Id. Mangialardi assisted with Moore’s 
operation by protecting Moore from detection by the Chicago police and arresting Moore’s rivals. Id. 
Moore and Mangialardi grew concerned that McCann was an informant, so they hatched a scheme to 
plant cocaine in McCann’s car and get him arrested. Id. Their plan worked. Id. After serving his sen-
tence, McCann learned that Mangialardi had been caught and prosecuted for his involvement with 
Moore’s trafficking business. Id. 783–84. McCann sued Mangialardi on the grounds that Mangi-
alardi’s failure to reveal to the court that the drugs in McCann’s car had been planted constituted a 
Brady violation. Id. at 784, 787. 
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the United States v. Ruiz decision that suggested a difference between the 
treatment of exculpatory and impeachment evidence.70 First, Ruiz relied on the 
idea that impeachment evidence is not essential information that a defendant 
must be aware of for a plea to be entered knowingly and voluntarily.71 The 
Seventh Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court must have intended for Ruiz 
only to apply to impeachment evidence, because a plea cannot be entered 
knowingly and voluntarily if a defendant is not aware of critical information 
like evidence unequivocally establishing the defendant’s innocence.72 Second, 
the fast track plea agreement challenged in Ruiz stipulated that the government 
would turn over any information establishing the defendant’s factual inno-
cence.73 In Ruiz, the Court relied on this protection to conclude that disclosure 
of impeachment evidence is not necessary to eliminate the risk that an innocent 
person might plead guilty.74 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, when the Su-
preme Court acknowledged the value that required disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence has in protecting against wrongful convictions, it confirmed that such 
a disclosure is constitutionally required under Ruiz.75 
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion to the Seventh 
Circuit when it addressed whether Brady applied to plea bargains in Smith v. 
Baldwin.76 Interestingly, the court made no reference to Ruiz and instead ap-
plied its existing precedent on the matter of Brady in the context of plea bar-
                                                                                                                           
 70 McCann, 337 F.3d at 787–88 (suggesting that, if exculpatory and impeachment evidence are 
distinct concepts, the Court’s ruling in Ruiz would mean that defendants are constitutionally entitled to 
exculpatory evidence before entering a guilty plea). 
 71 Id. at 787; see Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630 (noting that the required disclosure of favorable infor-
mation would be unreasonable because such information may be helpful to the defendant, depending 
on how much they know about the prosecution’s case). 
 72 See McCann, 337 F.3d at 787–88 (noting that impeachment evidence is distinct from exculpa-
tory evidence, which is critical information a defendant must be aware of to enter a plea voluntarily). 
 73 Id.; see Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (pointing out that the plea involved already requires that evidence 
showing the defendant’s innocence be turned over). 
 74 McCann, 337 F.3d at 787–88; see Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (stating that because the prosecution 
must turn over evidence demonstrating factual innocence, the risk that an innocent person would plead 
guilty is negated). 
 75 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (reasoning that because the plea agreement required the government 
to turn over materials showing factual innocence, innocent defendants would not be pressured into 
accepting a plea deal because they lacked information); McCann, 337 F.3d at 788 (reasoning that 
because the Court in Ruiz relied on the fast track plea’s requirement that evidence of factual innocence 
be disclosed as a protection for defendants, the Court would likely find that defendants are always 
entitled to this protection). 
 76 Smith, 510 F.3d at 1148. Either Roger Smith or his codefendant Jacob Edmunds, while jointly 
carrying out a burglary, beat the homeowner to death. Id. at 1130. Edmunds claimed that Smith had 
carried out the murder and agreed to take a polygraph test to prove it. Id. The prosecution told Ed-
munds that if the results confirmed his claim, they would give him a plea deal in exchange for testify-
ing against Smith. Id. In preparation for his defense, Smith requested the results of the polygraph, but 
the prosecution failed to turn them over. Id. 
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gains.77 Prior to Smith, the Ninth Circuit decided in 1995 in Sanchez v. United 
States that evidence must be turned over during the plea-bargaining process if 
knowledge of that evidence would have resulted in the defendant rejecting any 
plea offer and instead going trial.78 This suggested that the Ninth Circuit did 
not interpret Ruiz as controlling in situations involving exculpatory evidence.79 
Finally, in 2005, the Tenth Circuit also agreed that defendants may raise 
Brady claims after entering guilty pleas in United States v. Ohiri.80 There, the 
court reasoned that the evidence withheld constituted exculpatory evidence, 
not impeachment evidence, which differentiated the case from Ruiz.81 Addi-
tionally, the court was persuaded by the fact that the defendant entered his plea 
on the day of jury voir dire, whereas the fast track plea offered to the defendant 
in Ruiz had to be entered before indictment.82 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. at 1148 (outlining the pretrial disclosure requirements enumerated by the Supreme 
Court in Brady and subsequent cases, but turning to its own precedent in Sanchez v. United States to 
explain disclosure requirements during plea-bargaining); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 
1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that during a plea, evidence must be turned over if it is likely that the 
evidence would have encouraged a defendant to go to trial rather than accept a plea). In Sanchez, the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department arrested Hincapie Sanchez for dealing drugs. 50 F.3d at 
1451. He entered a guilty plea for possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine. Id. After pleading guilty, Sanchez became aware that two of the individuals who supplied the 
cocaine Sanchez sold were informants for the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Id. Sanchez claimed 
that if he had known this, he would not have pled guilty and instead “asserted defenses of entrapment 
and outrageous government conduct.” Id. Entrapment is a defense that can be raised when the gov-
ernment uses an undercover agent to coerce someone into committing a crime that they would not 
have committed if not for the influence of the undercover agent. Entrapment, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 6. Outrageous government conduct is a defense claiming that the government’s 
egregious conduct created the crimes. Outrageous-Conduct Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 6. 
 78 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454. 
 79 See Smith, 510 F.3d at 1148 (implying that the Ninth Circuit’s standard for disclosure during 
pleas as articulated in Sanchez requires the disclosure of material information, not impeachment evi-
dence, because including impeachment evidence in the standard would mean the standard conflicted 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz, which the court in Smith did not address). 
 80 133 F. App’x at 562. Emmanuel Ohiri served as the Chief Executive Officer of General Waste 
Corporation (GWC). Id. at 557. Ohiri and GWC’s Hazardous Waste and Construction Debris Opera-
tions Manager, John Thomas Morris, were charged with violating the Resources and Conservation 
Recovery Act. Id. at 556–57. Morris pleaded guilty to certain charges and signed an Acceptance of 
Responsibility Statement in which he asserted that Ohiri had no knowledge of some of his illegal 
waste management decisions. Id. at 557–58. The prosecution did not provide Morris’s statement to 
Ohiri prior to Ohiri’s entering a guilty plea. Id. at 557. 
 81 See id. at 562 (determining that a statement in which the co-conspirator admitted that the de-
fendant was unaware of any illegal behavior constituted exculpatory evidence). 
 82 See id. (concluding that because all exculpatory evidence must be turned over to the defendant 
before trial, the defendant in Ohiri should have had access to the co-conspirator’s statement at the 
time of the plea, which he entered on the day scheduled for jury selection). Jury voir dire is the pro-
cess of selecting a jury that takes place immediately before trial. Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 6. 
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the holding in Ruiz did not shield the government from Brady claims resulting 
from pleas entered immediately before trial.83 
B. Against Brady Claims After Guilty Pleas:  
The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits 
The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits disagree with the Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and have suggested that defendants are not constitu-
tionally entitled to exculpatory information prior to entering guilty pleas.84 In 
2010, in United States v. Mathur, the First Circuit employed the same reason-
ing that the Supreme Court used in Ruiz to conclude that the Brady require-
ment does not apply to the plea-bargaining process.85 The First Circuit held 
that Ruiz affirmed that the Court in Brady did not intend to protect defendants 
from any negative repercussions that may result from entering a guilty plea 
without knowledge of all pertinent information.86 Instead, the policy concerns 
that animate Brady pertain to a fair trial and, therefore, disappear when de-
fendants decide to concede their guilt through a plea.87 
Similarly, in 2010, the Second Circuit ruled in Friedman v. Rehal that a 
Brady violation did not occur when the prosecution failed to disclose prior to 
the defendant pleading guilty that it had used hypnosis to interview witness-
es.88 The court first explained that the evidence at issue unquestionably consti-
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 562 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not imply that the government may 
avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement 
while ignorant of withheld exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.”). 
 84 See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text. 
 85 Mathur, 624 F.3d at 507. In Mathur, the defendant and his business partner ran a hedge fund 
called Entrust Capital Management. Id. at 500–01. Both individuals were involved in an elaborate plot 
to cheat investors, resulting in the embezzlement of millions from client funds. Id. Despite the over-
whelming evidence against the defendant, he seized the opportunity to make a Brady claim when the 
prosecution waited until halfway through the trial to disclose a report containing mostly useless in-
formation, though some of it could be construed as impeachment information. Id. at 502–03. When his 
motion for a new trial on the grounds of a Brady violation failed and the court sentenced him to 120 
months of incarceration, the defendant appealed. Id. at 503. The defendant claimed that if he had ac-
cess to the belatedly disclosed information before the trial, he may have exercised the option to take a 
more lenient plea deal. Id. at 506. 
 86 See id. at 507 (explaining that, according to Ruiz, Brady does not guarantee that defendants will 
gain access to all pertinent information before they enter a plea). 
 87 See id. (noting that when a Brady claim is raised, the relevant concern is whether the defendant 
received a fair trial, which is not explicitly defined by the court, despite not having access to the sup-
pressed evidence). 
 88 See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 153–54 (holding that the evidence constituted impeachment, not 
exculpatory evidence, and even still, there is no constitutional requirement to disclose exculpatory 
evidence during plea-bargaining). In Friedman, the defendant ran computer classes for kids out of his 
home. Id. at 146. Police began an investigation into his business after a customs agent found a pack-
age with child pornography mailed to the defendant. Id. The government alleged that former students 
of Friedman accused him of sexual assault, but the government did not disclose the aggressive inter-
view tactics they used with the alleged victims. Id. Friedman claimed his constitutional rights were 
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tuted impeachment evidence, not exculpatory evidence, meaning a Brady 
claim is precluded by Ruiz.89 Nonetheless, the court foreclosed the possibility 
that the outcome of the case would have been different had the evidence been 
exculpatory by reasoning that the Supreme Court regarded impeachment and 
exculpatory evidence as equal in its Brady jurisprudence, so it would likely do 
so in the plea-bargaining context as well.90 As a result, the Second Circuit sug-
gested that Ruiz applies to both impeachment and exculpatory evidence.91 
In 2010, the Fourth Circuit also suggested that it would be unwilling to 
extend Brady to the guilty plea context in United States v. Moussaoui.92 The 
court cited language asserting that the Brady requirement existed to ensure fair 
trials.93 Although the court recognized the possibility that Ruiz applied only to 
impeachment evidence and not exculpatory evidence, it cited a previous deci-
sion of the Fourth Circuit which held that undisclosed death penalty mitigation 
evidence did not invalidate a defendant’s guilty plea.94 The court ultimately 
determined that it did not need to decide whether the evidence withheld consti-
tuted a Brady violation because the defendant failed to show that the withheld 
evidence rendered his plea involuntary.95 Still, the language of the opinion 
would suggest the Fourth Circuit opposes an expansion of Brady.96 
                                                                                                                           
violated when the prosecution failed to disclose that it had used hypnosis during alleged victim inter-
views. Id. at 151. 
 89 See id. at 153 (explaining that the use of hypnosis to possibly encourage inaccurate recollec-
tions falls precisely into the category of impeachment evidence); Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine 
Corp., 988 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that impeachment evidence is any evidence that 
could tarnish a witness’s testimony and make it less effective by showing the jury that it may be unre-
liable). 
 90 Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154. 
 91 See id. at 155 (pointing to a previous Fifth Circuit opinion in which the court declined to extend 
Brady to the plea-bargaining stage because doing so would expand Brady to protect defendants who 
regret their own decision to reap the benefits of a plea deal). The events of Friedman were portrayed 
in a film entitled Capturing the Friedmans, which detailed the aggressive and suggestive investigation 
tactics used by detectives in the case. Id. at 151; CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO Documentary 
2003). 
 92 See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 286 (citing its own precedent which declined to extend Brady to 
mitigation evidence, which is evidence used to diminish the culpability of defendants facing the death 
penalty, withheld during a death penalty trial to suggest it would be hesitant to do so for plea bar-
gains). The defendant, Zacarais Moussaoui, faced charges for conspiracy in relation to the 9/11 at-
tacks. Id. at 266. Weeks before the attacks, he aroused the skepticism of his instructor at a pilot 
school, prompting law enforcement to bring him into custody for an expired visa. Id. Moussaoui al-
leged a Brady violation occurred because the prosecution failed to provide him with multiple state-
ments that might have collectively shown that the organizers of 9/11 never slated him to participate in 
the first round of attacks. Id. at 285. 
 93 See id. (“The Brady right, however, is a trial right.”). 
 94 See id. at 286 (citing Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2002)) (holding that Ruiz pre-
vented a defendant from attempting to invalidate his guilty plea when the government withheld infor-
mation that might be relevant mitigation evidence during a defendant’s death penalty trial). 
 95 See id. (stating that the court need not resolve the issue of whether Jones applied to Moussaoui, 
because Moussaoui did not have any evidence showing that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence during the plea phase made his plea involuntary). The government not only notified 
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Finally, in Alvarez, the Fifth Circuit held that the Constitution does not 
require disclosure of exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining pro-
cess.97 The court reasoned that, because no case law from the Supreme Court 
or other circuit courts decisively establishes that failure to disclose evidence 
during the plea-bargaining process constitutes a Brady violation, it will defer to 
its existing precedent, which held that it does not.98 
III. THE SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO CLARIFY THE HOLDING OF RUIZ AND 
MAKE THE DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE MANDATORY 
It would have been beneficial for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
Alvarez v. City of Brownsville to settle the disagreement among lower courts on 
the holding of United States v. Ruiz.99 When given another opportunity to clari-
fy Ruiz, the Court should hold that the disclosure of exculpatory evidence is 
mandatory during the plea-bargaining process.100 Plea-bargaining has replaced 
jury trials as the primary method for resolving criminal charges, and the consti-
tutional rights of the accused must be redefined to reflect this shift.101 
In 2013, more than ninety–five percent of federal criminal charges ended 
with a plea bargain.102 This reflects a drastic departure from what the Founding 
Fathers of the United States imagined for the justice system and the constitu-
                                                                                                                           
Moussaoui that it intended to eventually provide him with exculpatory, confidential information, it 
also informed him why the evidence might be exculpatory. Id. at 287. Still, Moussaoui chose to plead 
guilty before the conclusion of the discovery process. Id. As a result, the court concluded that Mous-
saoui entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 288. 
 96 See id. at 285–86 (noting that it is possible that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence could render a plea involuntary, but also reiterating all of the reasons the Supreme Court 
provided that would make that possibility unlikely, including that Brady only applies to trials and that 
required disclosure would place a burden on the government). 
 97 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 392–94 (reasoning that Ruiz applies to exculpatory evidence in addi-
tion to impeachment evidence, and therefore criminal defendants are not entitled to exculpatory evi-
dence during the plea-bargaining phase). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2018); see supra note 10 (detailing the 
circuit split). See generally United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (summarizing the circuit 
split). 
 100 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633 (holding that impeachment evidence does not need to be disclosed 
during the plea-bargaining phase); Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 382, 410, 412, 416 (Costa, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that “[d]ue process requires more than we afford the accused today” because Supreme Court prec-
edent surrounding Brady and plea-bargaining suggest Brady extends to plea-bargaining, Ruiz is not 
controlling, and state court systems offer proof that requiring the disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
during plea bargains will not over burden the government). 
 101 See Rakoff, supra note 12 (stating that of the 2.2 million people currently incarcerated in the 
United States, over two million of them are there because they took a plea bargain). 
 102 Id. Of the federal criminal charges in 2013, eight percent of charges were dropped. Id. Of the 
remaining charges, ninety-seven percent were resolved with a plea bargain, and three percent were 
resolved with a jury trial. Id. 
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tional mechanisms they put into place to ensure fairness within the system.103 
It is very concerning that many of the constitutional protections offered to 
criminal defendants are waived or inapplicable during the plea-bargaining pro-
cess.104 According to the National Registry of Exonerations, approximately ten 
percent of legally recognized exonerations since 1989 have involved individu-
als who pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.105 Although it may seem 
unlikely that someone would plead guilty to a crime they did not commit, the 
data suggests there are persuasive reasons to do so in some circumstances.106 
There is an enormous power imbalance that allows prosecutors virtually un-
checked discretion to determine the terms of a plea deal.107 When the accused 
do not have a clear idea of the case the prosecutor has against them, it may feel 
impossible to risk a jury trial and the maximum sentence for a guilty verdict.108 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. Jury trials were intended to locate the truth, ensure fairness, and bolster against tyranny. Id. 
The authors of the Constitution overwhelmingly agreed that jury trials were an essential part of the 
U.S. criminal justice system. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (pointing out that 
those involved in the creation of the United States all agreed on the importance of trial by jury: those 
who favored a strong central government viewed trial by jury as an essential protection of liberty, and 
those who favored a weak central government viewed it as a central pillar of free government); Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-15-02-0259 [https://perma.cc/GY93-M78V] (“I consider [trial by jury] as the only an-
chor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitu-
tion.”).  
 104 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 14–15 (2018) [hereinaf-
ter THE TRIAL PENALTY] (explaining that by entering pleas, criminal defendants forfeit access to 
discovery, the opportunity to cross examine witnesses, the ability to appeal, the ability to make consti-
tutional objections, and a trial by a jury of their peers who must unanimously find them guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt); supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that the waiver of these protec-
tions during pleas contributes to a criminal justice system that disproportionately punishes poor and 
minority citizens). 
 105 Rakoff, supra note 12. An exoneration occurs when someone who was convicted of a crime is 
formally relieved of all wrongdoing. Exonerate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
 106 See Rakoff, supra note 12 (noting that innocent people may choose to plead guilty because 
they fear they do not have a strong enough defense to win at trial or to guarantee they will not receive 
the death penalty). 
 107 Id. The plea-bargaining process is off the record and often coercive due to the “trial penalty,” 
which refers to the difference between the sentence offered during the plea-bargaining phase and the 
sentence the defendant would receive if found guilty at trial. See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 
104, at 16 (explaining how there are often multiple statutes, each carrying a different penalty, that 
punish the same criminal conduct, which enables prosecutors to dictate the length of the sentence a 
defendant will receive based on how they charge the conduct). Prosecutors are free to offer a defend-
ant the opportunity to plea to one crime and tell the defendant that if they turn down the plea, they will 
be charged with more serious crimes at trial. See Rakoff, supra note 12 (explaining how the trial pen-
alty can play out in cases involving illegal drug distribution, where prosecutors can charge defendants 
as individual sellers, carrying a light sentence, or as co-conspirators in an enormous distribution 
scheme, carrying a far lengthier sentence). 
 108 See Rakoff, supra note 12 (noting that in 2012, federal narcotics defendants who pled guilty 
received an average sentence of five years and four months; in contrast, defendants sentenced after a 
guilty verdict at trial received an average sentence of sixteen years). 
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For many of the legally recognized exonerees, the decision to enter a guilty 
plea could have been one between life and death; the exonerees may have 
plead guilty to guarantee life in prison rather than risk the possibility of being 
sentenced to death if found guilty at trial.109 
The implications of plea-bargaining illustrate why it is essential for dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence to be constitutionally required.110 Although 
subsequent interpretations of Brady have focused on the right to a fair trial, the 
opinion clearly articulated that the right to a fair trial is rooted in principles of 
justice.111 The Court emphasized that the government has succeeded in its role, 
not when the accused are labeled guilty, but instead when a just outcome is 
reached.112 The reality of the plea-bargaining system is that defendants are 
negatively impacted by the power imbalance and by the possibility of a secre-
tive process.113 
The conclusion that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed during the 
plea-bargaining process is not at odds with the holding of Ruiz.114 There are 
compelling arguments that exculpatory and impeachment evidence are distinct 
concepts.115 First, the Court in Ruiz reasoned that impeachment evidence did 
not fit into the category of critical evidence that must be turned over for a plea 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See id. (noting that defendants charged with death penalty eligible offenses may plead guilty 
to a deal that assures a sentence of life in prison, because they are not willing to risk being found 
guilty and sentenced to death at trial). 
 110 See id. (arguing that the information imbalance during plea-bargaining can cause wrongful 
convictions). 
 111 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). In his dissenting opinion in Alvarez, Judge 
Gregg Costa sums up how the majority opinion violates due process. 904 F.3d at 416 (Costa, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that the government imprisoning a person while withholding evidence that may 
prove the person’s innocence violates the principle foundation of the United States’ justice system, 
“which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer”); see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 
(1935) (stating that the due process requirement is not satisfied when a conviction is obtained by in-
tentionally misleading the jury and court while simultaneously pretending the trial is fair). 
 112 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see Dybdahl, supra note 30 (explaining that Justice William Douglas 
believed that the goals of the criminal justice system were to find the truth and to do justice, and that 
he fully intended to use his opinion in Brady to promote this agenda). 
 113 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that during plea bargains, prosecutors 
control the charge, sentence, and flow of information to the defendant). 
 114 See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (asserting that any evidence that 
would cause a defendant to go to trial rather than take a plea must be turned over at the plea-
bargaining stage); United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
exculpatory evidence must be turned over to the defendant prior to entering a guilty plea); McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that prosecutors are constitutionally required 
to disclose exculpatory evidence during the plea-bargaining process). 
 115 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 406 (Costa, J., dissenting) (explaining that exculpatory evidence was 
not included in the holding of Ruiz because the plea at issue in Ruiz stipulated that any evidence 
demonstrating the defendant’s innocence, which is the precise definition of exculpatory evidence, 
must be turned over to the defendant); Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 562 (holding that the evidence at issue 
constituted exculpatory evidence, and therefore Ruiz did not apply); McCann, 337 F.3d at 787–88 
(noting that impeachment evidence is very difficult to identify and is consequently different from 
exculpatory evidence). 
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to be voluntary.116 What critical evidence would the Court be referring to if not 
exculpatory evidence?117 Exculpatory evidence is critical to defendants be-
cause receiving such evidence would likely guarantee a defendant would 
choose to go to trial rather than plead guilty.118 Second, the Court in Ruiz relied 
on the fact that the plea in Ruiz contained a requirement that the prosecution 
turn over exculpatory evidence to conclude that the defendant was sufficiently 
protected.119 The mere acknowledgement of this provision is evidence that the 
Court believes exculpatory evidence to be unique.120 The most compelling in-
dication that the Court did not intend for Ruiz to apply to exculpatory evidence 
can be gleaned from Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion, which 
stated that no part of Brady applies to the plea-bargaining stage.121 Not a single 
Justice joined his opinion, meaning that not a single justice on the Court 
agreed with the proposition that Brady does not apply at all to plea bargains.122 
Because of the disagreement in the Circuit Courts and the new constitu-
tional quandaries present in the plea-bargaining process, the Supreme Court 
should grant certiorari in the next circuit case to address the issue.123 In doing 
so, the Court should hold that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed prior to 
guilty pleas.124 
CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, that crimi-
nal defendants are not entitled to exculpatory evidence during the plea-
bargaining process, places it in the ongoing debate among the circuit courts on 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See McCann, 337 F.3d at 787 (pointing out that the Court in Ruiz held that the government is 
not constitutionally required to turn over exculpatory evidence because impeachment evidence, which 
is helpful to the defendant but not proof of factual innocence, can hardly be classified as crucial evi-
dence that the defendants must know about before entering a guilty plea). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630 (reasoning that prosecutors are not required to turn over impeach-
ment information during plea bargains because such information would not necessarily help defend-
ants and therefore ignorance of the information would not render a plea involuntary). 
 119 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631; see Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 412 (Costa, J., dissenting) (explaining that Ruiz 
did not have to address whether exculpatory evidence must be disclosed pre-plea because the plea in 
Ruiz explicitly stated that such evidence must be disclosed). 
 120 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 412 (Costa, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court in Ruiz went to great 
lengths to explain its reasoning for holding that impeachment information need not be turned over 
prior to a plea, yet it could have simply stated that Brady did not apply to guilty pleas if that is what it 
meant). 
 121 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that Brady was intended to 
prevent unfair trials, and therefore, it does not apply during plea bargains). 
 122 Id.; see supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 123 See supra notes 10, 100–101 and accompanying text (outlining the split in the understanding 
of the holding of Ruiz among circuits and arguing that the holding of Ruiz does not apply to exculpa-
tory evidence). 
 124 Id. 
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the applicability of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ruiz. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court does not explicitly provide an answer, the funda-
mental focus on justice throughout the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the 
Court would disagree with the Fifth Circuit. Until the Supreme Court address-
es the topic itself, criminal defendants weighing whether to accept a guilty plea 
could be at the mercy of prosecutor’s discretion on what evidence to disclose 
during the plea stage. 
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